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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we assess the impact of fiscal policy discretion on economic activity in the 
short and  medium-term. Using a panel of 132 countries from 1960 to 2008, we find that 
fiscal policy discretion provides a net stimulus to the economy in the short-run and 
crowding-in effects are amplified once crisis episodes are controlled for– in particular, 
banking crises - giving a great scope for fiscal policy stimulus packages. However, 
crowding-out effects take over in the long-run – especially, in the case of debt crises -, 
in line with the concerns about long-term debt sustainability.  
 
Keywords: Fiscal policy discretion, GDP growth, private consumption, private 
investment, crowding-in, crowding-out. 
JEL: E0, E6. 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Dans cet article, nous discutons l’effet sur l’activité économique des politiques fiscales 
discrétionnaires dans le court et moyen terme. En utilisant un panel de 132 pays entre 
1960 et 2008, nous trouvons que les politiques fiscales discrétionnaires stimulent 
l’économie dans le court terme, les effets de crowding-in étant amplifiés si l’on contrôle 
des périodes de crises dans le modèle – en particulier, les crises bancaires. Toutefois, les 
effets de crowding-out dominent dans le long terme – en particulier, en cas de crise de 
la dette -, cohérent avec la problematique de soutenabilité de la dette. 
 
 
Mots clés: politiques fiscales discrétionnaires, croissance de PIB, consommation privée, 
investissement privé, crowding-in, crowding-out. 
JEL: E0, E6. 
“At the onset of the crisis, countries needed to firm up their finances, both to cover the 
costs of financial restructuring, and depending on the balance of payments situation to 
reduce their current account deficits, which depend on in part on the budget deficit.” 
(Fischer, 1998) 
 
1. Introduction 
The occurrence of the recent global crisis became key for assessing the role that 
economic policy and, in particular, fiscal policy can play on influencing economic 
activity, particularly during episodes of severe downturns (Castro, 2010; Agnello and 
Schuknecht, 2011).  
 Indeed, many countries have actively adopted fiscal expansionary measures - 
especially, aimed at boosting government spending - in reaction to such an 
extraordinary event. While there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the effect of 
these fiscal measures on economic activity (Cimadomo et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2011), 
these interventions pose major challenges for policymakers, because they represent a 
valuable test to the long-term sustainability of public finances as the evidence on current 
developments in government bond markets shows (Schuknecht et al., 2009). In addition, 
they may lead to business cycle de-synchronization (Rafiq and Mallick, 2008; Mallick 
and Mohsin, 2010) and negatively impinge on the nexus between monetary and 
financial stability (Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010a; Castro, 2011). 
Similarly, despite the consensual view on the withdrawal of such stimulus as the 
recovery materializes and the fact that several developed countries are now facing fiscal 
sustainability challenges, the effect that fiscal retrenchments may have on economic 
performance is not clear. In addition, while there seems to be an agreement on the long-
term benefits of government debt reductions, there is no unified view on the short-term 
effects of fiscal austerity (Jansen et al., 2008). 
Indeed the argument about the effectiveness of fiscal policy can be dated back to 
the Keynesian model that predicts that expansionary fiscal policy (i.e. a rise in 
government spending or a cut in government taxation) boosts disposable income, raises 
private consumption and partially crowds-out investment via the increase of interest 
rate. At the empirical level, the evidence seems to confirm the positive short-term effect 
of fiscal policy on consumption and output (Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and 
Perotti, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). 
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However, other studies suggest the possibility of Non-Keynesian effects 
associated with fiscal policy measures. The underlying idea is that a permanent 
reduction of government spending may lead to an increase in output and consumption, 
because agents will expect an increase of future income due to the cut of future taxation 
(Feldstein, 1982; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). In this case, fiscal contractions can be 
“expansionary” as a result of the improvement in household and business confidence 
and cutting budget deficits could stimulate the economy even in the short-term.  
More recently and in light of the exceptional economic developments, research 
has started to focus on the role that fiscal policy can play in times of crisis. In this 
context, Alesina et al. (2002) argue that initial fiscal conditions play a key role in the 
response to the crisis responses in both advanced and emerging economies, the reason 
being linked to the fact that countercyclical fiscal policies are more likely to be adopted 
when sufficient fiscal space was created prior to the crisis. IMF (2009a) reports that 
expansionary fiscal policy is particularly effective in shortening the spells of recessions 
associated with financial crises in advanced economies and boosting recoveries in the 
aftermath.  For emerging markets, the evidence is mixed due to limited credit access, 
procyclical spending bias and small automatic stabilizers which have constrained the 
ability of governments to adopt fiscal measures that help counteracting the effects of 
adverse economic conditions (IMF, 2009b).  
Baldacci et al. (2009) assess the effects of fiscal policy responses during 
episodes of systemic banking crises in advanced and emerging market economies. The 
authors show that timely countercyclical fiscal responses can shorten the length of crisis 
episodes. Moreover, when crises are caused by financial sector distress, fiscal 
expansions increase the likelihood of earlier recovery. Baldacci and Kumar (2010) 
argue that timely countercyclical fiscal measures contribute to shortening the length of 
banking crises by stimulating aggregate demand. Hutchison et al. (2010) show that 
fiscal contraction is significantly correlated with large output losses during sudden-stops 
and balance of payments crisis in emerging markets and developing countries. Heim 
(2010a) finds that, calculating the effects for recession and non-recession periods and 
comparing them to models with average crowding-out and models without crowding-
out, one concludes that the magnitude of the crowding-out effects is roughly the same. 
Spilimbergo et al. (2008) review the historical episodes of financial crises and the fiscal 
policy conduction during these periods. The authors show that an optimal fiscal package 
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to mitigate the adverse consequences of financial crises should be collective, contingent, 
diversified, large, lasting, and sustainable. 
However, fiscal policy measures aimed at the crisis resolution generally imply 
costly government restructuring of private sector’s balance sheet and, consequently, a 
significant increase in public debt. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b, 2009) find that 
banking crises lead to sharp declines in tax revenues, as well as to significant increases 
in government spending and, at the end of these episodes, economic growth recovers 
very slowly. Laeven and Valencia (2008) estimate that the net fiscal costs associated 
with systemic banking crises – i.e. a situation where a country’s corporate and financial 
sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions face difficulties 
repaying loans on time – are substantial. Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010) find that 
banking crises are followed by a medium-term increase in the government gross debt-
to-GDP ratio of about 37 percentage points.  
From this literature, it emerges that government interventions to boost private 
sector credit and to stimulate domestic demand may be costly and may increase the risk 
of high-inflation and lower private investment and GDP growth in the medium term. 
Therefore, there is a potential conflict between the short-term effects of countercyclical 
fiscal expansions during downturns and their medium-term growth implications, a 
feature that we investigate in the current paper. 
The main goal of this work is to assess the macroeconomic impact of 
discretionary fiscal policy. We use a two-step approach. In the first step, we identify 
fiscal discretionary shocks by estimating a policy rule for government consumption. 
This methodology is built on the work of Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006) - regarding the 
effects of the volatility of fiscal policy shocks on long-term growth - and  Afonso et al. 
(2010) - in assessing the determinants of spending volatility. In this way, we are able to 
extract the discretionary component of fiscal policy and, thereby, to quantify the 
unexpected variation in the policy measure – which would, otherwise, be contaminated 
by the automatic response of fiscal policy to economic activity –, while dealing with the 
endogeneity issue. In the second step, we assess the impact of fiscal discretion on GDP 
growth and private sector’s demand (more specifically, private consumption and 
investment growth) over different time horizons. This allows us to look at the size of the 
crowding-in and crowding-out effects and to analyze whether the potentially 
expansionary short-term effect is reverted in the medium-term. In this context, our paper 
is inspired by the works of Heim (2010a) and Furceri and Sousa (2011a). 
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Using a panel of 132 countries from 1960 to 2008, we show that fiscal policy 
discretion can provide a net stimulus to the economy in the short-term, i.e. crowding-in 
effects are likely to dominate over short horizons. However, crowding-out effects are 
stronger in the long-run, although they are never strong enough to completely offset the 
overall expansionary impact of government spending. This highlights the importance of 
timely fiscal responses during economic downturns and the role of fiscal policy as a key 
stabilizing tool. 
In addition, we find that crowding-in effects tend to be stronger and more 
persistent for OECD countries than for developing countries. As for the crowding-out 
effects, they seem to affect significantly on the dynamics of investment growth and, to a 
smaller extent, on private consumption. 
Next, we turn to the analysis of the role that fiscal policy can play in times of 
crisis, drawing on the work by Corsetti et al. (2009). Our findings suggest that, 
regardless the typology of crisis, crowding-in effects are magnified once these 
exceptional circumstances are controlled for, and dominate during the first years of the 
crises. This is consistent with the idea that there is a great scope for fiscal policy 
stimulus packages in order to boost economic recovery. However, crowding-out effects 
take over in the long-run and significantly reduce private sector’s spending. 
Interestingly, the crowding-out effects might be so strong that they completely 
annihilate the previous expansionary effect. In particular, in the case of banking crises, 
our results show that a discretionary increase in public spending is key for a long-lasting 
economic recovery and the size of the crowding-in effects make it a very successful tool 
in such context. As for domestic debt crises, a boost in government spending has a 
negative effect of real GDP growth which persists over time. This is consistent with 
rising concerns about the long-term sustainability of public debt, which crowds-out 
private consumption and investment and exacerbates the crisis. As a result, there is a 
potential trade-off between the short-term and the medium-term impact of fiscal policy 
during episodes of debt crises, as these policy measures might have destabilizing 
effects.  
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section two describes the 
empirical methodology used to measure fiscal policy discretion and to assess its 
macroeconomic impact. Section three discusses the results. Section four evaluates the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy in times of crisis. Finally, Section five concludes with the 
main findings and major policy implications. 
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2. Empirical Methodology  
2.1 Measuring fiscal policy discretion 
Following Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2011), we extract the discretionary 
component of government spending by estimating, for each country i (with i =1,…,N ), 
the following fiscal policy reaction function: 
 
titiitiitiiiti vXgyg ,,1,,, +Γ+Δ+Δ+=Δ −γβμ   (1) 
 
where g is the logarithm of real government consumption,1 y is the logarithm of real 
GDP, and X is a set of controls including inflation, inflation squared, a time trend and 
the logarithm of real public debt. Inflation is included to ensure that our results are not 
driven by high inflation episodes in which case the comovement between real 
government spending and output might be due to monetary instability rather than fiscal 
policy. Moreover, we also account for the potential nonlinearity between fiscal 
developments and inflation by including the inflation squared term. We consider a time 
trend in our specifications, since government spending can have a deterministic time 
trend in addition to a stochastic one. Finally, the initial level of debt controls for the 
possibility that discretionary spending might be limited for countries facing heavy debt 
burden.  
In this context, we expect that fiscal policymakers are reluctant to deliberate 
increases in spending that are financed by borrowing, otherwise they would be running 
the risks of loosing policy credibility and countering the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. 
The estimates of the country-specific coefficients iβ  and iγ ,  and  in 
specification (1) represent, respectively, the measures of responsiveness and persistence 
(Afonso et al., 2010) and a quantitative estimate of discretionary spending. By 
construction, this latter measure can be interpreted as a proxy of spending decisions 
tiv ,
                                                 
1 Similarly to Fatás and Mihov (2011), we consider government consumption rather than total 
government spending, because the former is readily comparable across countries and is not being subject 
to frequent structural breaks or changes in definitions. In addition, as Ilzetki and Vegh (2008) point, for 
policy purposes, one should look at instruments (such as government consumption) rather than outcomes 
(such as government spending), as the later cannot be controlled by policymakers. From an empirical 
point of view, the consideration of government spending (instead of government consumption) would 
also be more vulnerable to a lack of precision in the identification of three main characteristics of fiscal 
policy (responsiveness, persistence and discretion). The reason for this is that government spending 
includes transfers and debt service, and we also include the debt level among the set of control variables. 
Finally, data for government consumption is available for a larger number of countries and a longer time 
period. Having said that, we recognize the obvious caveat that government consumption only accounts for 
a part of fiscal spending and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a comprehensive measure of fiscal policy. 
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which are taken by the governments for reasons not directly related to economic 
conditions, i.e. it corresponds to a measure of the fiscal policy shock that is orthogonal 
to the state of the economy. In addition, given that we account for the initial level of the 
debt in equation (1), the increase in spending reflects  a public spending shock that 
leaves the level of debt unchanged.   
In order to control for potential endogeneity due to the simultaneity in the 
determination of output and government spending, we estimate equation (1) using an 
Instrumental Variables – Two-Stage Least Squares (IV-2SLS) method.  
 
2.2 Assessing the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy discretion 
The residuals of regression (1) obtained for each country i are then used in the 
second-step in order to assess the impact of discretionary government spending on 
aggregate demand.2 To do so, we estimate a dynamic panel growth equation of the 
following form:  
 
tiiti
j
jtijtiiti vyy ,,
4
1
,1,, ˆ ετλδβμ ++Ζ++Δ+=Δ ∑
=
−−   (2) 
 
where yt denotes the logarithm of real GDP while  indicates, for each country i,  the 
vector of estimates of discretionary spending.
tvˆ
3  Zt  is a vector of control variables that 
can affect growth in the short-term, such as the log of openness and population growth 
                                                 
2 Pagan (1984) argues that when (i) the predetermined variables that appear in the equation of interest are 
also included in the first-stage regression, (ii) only lagged values of the generated regressors appear as 
explanatory variables, and (iii) an instrumental variable estimation is used in the second-stage, valid 
statistical inference can be made with a small loss of efficiency. 
3 Including lags allows for a delayed impact of discretionary measures on real activity. From a theoretical 
point of view, it is commonly accepted that the response of macroeconomic aggregates (such as GDP, 
consumption, investment) to fiscal policy is lagged, not contemporaneous. For instance, all VAR-based 
evidence assume that the macroeconomy does not respond on impact (Afonso and Sousa, 2011a, 2011b; 
Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Giordano et al., 2007; Castro and Cos, 2008; 
Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). Moreover, in equation (1), we follow Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006) and, 
therefore, control for the contemporaneous response of government spending to output changes in the 
same spirit of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). From an empirical point of view, our strategy also avoids 
getting biased estimates for the coefficients associated to fiscal discretion in the second stage. In fact, the 
shock is a function of the dependent variable. Consequently, the inclusion of contemporaneous fiscal 
discretion in equations (2) to (4) - instead of its lags -, would imply that the coefficient associated with 
fiscal discretion would be the “sum” of its own explanatory power and its covariance with the dependent 
variable. Putting it differently, the coefficient would be biased and the shock could not be retrieved or 
properly identified. Indeed, while tackling the issue of endogeneity and simultaneity in the first-stage, the 
issue of identification in the second-stage still requires a careful treatment. This is less of a problem when 
we only add the lags of the shock to the second-stage regressions. 
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rate. Finally, we include country-fixed effects ( iμ ) to account for differences among 
countries’ growth rates and time-fixed effects ( iτ ) to control for the occurrence of 
global shocks and their impact on the (normal) business cycle.  Since specification (2) is 
a dynamic panel and embodies fixed effects, the parameters are estimated by a two-step 
robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator as discussed in Arellano and 
Bond (1991).4 In fact, when Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are used, the lagged 
dependent variable will be correlated with the error term, tiiiti ,,,, ετμω ++= , even if 
we assume that disturbances are not themselves autocorrelated.5 As result, OLS 
estimates are likely to be biased.   
 In order to assess whether discretionary government spending produces 
crowding-in versus crowding-out effects, we re-estimate equation (2) for private 
consumption growth ( ): tic ,Δ
 
i
j
jtijtiiti vcc
4
1
,1,, ˆ τδβμ ++++Δ+=Δ ∑
=
−− t,iλΖ ti,ε   (3) 
 
and investment growth ( ): tii ,Δ
              
tiiti
j
jtijtiiti vii ,,
4
1
,1,, ˆ ετλδβμ ++Ζ++Δ+=Δ ∑
=
−−   (4) 
 
where all the right-hand side variables have the usual meanings. The abovementioned 
questions concerning the estimation issues are still valid for equations (3) and (4) and, 
therefore, a two-step robust GMM estimator is used.  
Crowding-in versus crowding-out effects are explored by estimating the 
response of consumption and investment growth rates to a discretionary spending 
shock. Impulse-Response Functions (IRFs), along with the 68% error bands, are 
obtained via the delta method.6, 7 More specifically, IRFs are computed by perturbating 
the estimated regressor (i.e. fiscal policy discretion), not the shock of the equation. 
                                                 
4 Windmeijer’s (2005) small-sample correction for two-step standard errors is also implemented.  
5 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Baltagi (2001). 
6 The impulse-response functions are consistent with specifications (2)-(4). In this case, unless we impose 
some kind of factorization, the response of GDP, consumption and investment to the discretionary fiscal 
spending component cannot be assessed. In our framework, this can be achieved by including only the 
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3. Data and Empirical Results 
3.1 Data 
The data cover 132 countries and are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators for the time period 1960-2008. We consider annual data for 
GDP, private consumption, private investment and government spending. Due to data 
availability (both in terms of time and country dimension), we proxy private investment 
and government spending with gross fixed capital formation and public consumption, 
respectively. All variables are expressed in real per capita terms, where we use the GDP 
deflator to convert nominal in real constant terms. Data on public debt are retrieved 
from the Historical Public Debt Database assembled by the Fiscal Affairs Department 
of the International Monetary Fund (Abbas et al., 2010). Series dating a variety of 
financial crisis (banking, currency, domestic and external default or restructuring, and 
inflation) are provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and are available at: 
http://terconnect.umd.edu/creinhar/Courses.html. 
 
3.2. Estimates of fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence and discretion 
As discussed in section 2.1, discretionary spending measures are constructed 
based on country-specific regressions summarized by equation (1). It is clear that the 
lower and less significant the coefficients associated with GDP growth (i.e. fiscal policy 
responsiveness, iβ ) and with lagged spending growth (i.e. fiscal policy persistence, iγ ) 
are, the larger the discretionary component of government spending will be ( ). For 
brevity, in Table 1, we report estimates for different groups of countries.  
tiv ,
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. ] 
 
The positive sign of the coefficient associated with responsiveness is consistent 
with the empirical literature suggesting that, over the post-World War II period, fiscal 
authorities in emerging and industrialized countries have responded in a “procyclical” 
                                                                                                                                               
lags of the shock in the set of explanatory variables of the second-stage regressions. Although we do not 
estimate a (Bayesian) Vector Auto-Regressive or Maximum Likelihood framework, the underlying 
mechanism is similar. In addition, if the discretionary component of government spending is thought as a 
predictive variable and we assess its economic content over different time horizons, then our second-stage 
framework can be described as a set of forecasting regressions. In this context, predictors and predicted 
variables need to be evaluated at different moments in time, not contemporaneously. 
7 For the use of 68% probability bands in the context of monetary policy, see Leeper and Zha (2003), 
Mackowiak (2006) and Sims and Zha (2006a. b). Afonso and Sousa (2011a, b) also refer to these bands 
for assessing the impact of fiscal policy shocks. 
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manner to fluctuations in the economic activity (Alesina et al., 2008; Ilzetki and Vegh, 
2008).8 This characteristic is particularly relevant for developing countries (the 
coefficient associated with GDP growth is 0.509 for non-OECD countries, which 
compares with 0.275 for OECD countries), and gives support to the role of 
imperfections in credit markets preventing borrowing in bad times (Gavin and Perotti, 
1997) or rent-seeking behavior in good times (Tornell and Lane, 1999). 
As for the persistence of fiscal policy, our results suggest that it is mainly 
relevant for Europe and North-America, suggesting some inertia of the budgetary 
process in these countries and a degree of unstable or erratic fiscal policy behavior in 
the remaining ones (Agnello and Sousa, 2009). 
Interestingly, the empirical findings show a significant response of government 
consumption to changes in the debt level. This highlights the existence of an important 
stabilizing effect: when public debt increases, government consumption is cut, thereby, 
bringing it to a sustainable path. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the discretionary 
component of government consumption across different groups of countries. In line 
with Afonso et al. (2010), the volatility of discretionary spending is negatively 
correlated with the level of income. For instance, the standard deviation of the share of 
discretionary spending in government consumption is almost fifteen times larger for 
Non-OECD countries than for OECD countries. Consistently with this result, we note 
that the average size and volatility of discretion  is substantially higher for developing 
countries (notably, African and Latin American countries) than for industrialized 
countries (such as, in Europe and North-America). All in all, these features corroborate 
the argument that developing countries typically face more politically unstable regimes 
and tighter credit acess conditions. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. ] 
 
3.3 Baseline model 
In this section, we discuss the results of our baseline models (2)-(4). Table 3 
summarizes the main findings. For each model, columns 1 and 2 show the parameter 
estimates obtained using different econometric specifications. In column 1, we begin by 
                                                 
8 For a survey of the topic, see Cimadomo (2011). Similarly, Agnello and Cimadomo (2011) provide 
evidence for the European Union. 
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quantifying the empirical relationship between the variables of interest (GDP, 
consumption and investment growth rate) and the lagged discretionary part of 
government spending. We then examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of 
additional controls, such as the log of openness and population growth rate (column 2). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. ] 
 
We note that GDP growth and investment growth exhibit a reasonable degree of 
persistence, as the coefficient associated to the lagged dependent variable is statistically 
significant. This has two main implications. First, from a theoretical point of view, it 
suggests that it is important to distinguish the effects of discretionary fiscal policy from 
the ones related to the normal dynamics of aggregate demand and its sub-components. 
Second, from an empirical perspective, it supports the use of a dynamic panel 
estimation.  
In addition, lags of the dependent variables are found valid instruments in our 
GMM specification. In fact, we cannot reject the hypothesis of the joint validity of the 
moment conditions (Hansen’s (1982) J-test) and we find no higher order correlation in 
the idiosyncratic disturbance terms, ti,ε . 
In what concerns the effect of discretionary government spending on GDP 
growth, we can see that it is initially positive and it turns negative after one year. This 
suggests that discretionary fiscal policy that relies on spending increase has an 
expansionary effect on domestic demand in the short-term and a contractionary effect 
afterwards. Interestingly, the similarity of the results obtained from the consumption 
and the investment equations seems to support the existence of crowding-in in the very 
short-run and crowding-out afterwards. 
Looking at the extended models (column 2), we find that the inclusion of 
additional control variables, Z, does not change the results concerning the importance of 
discretionary fiscal policy.9 We find that Openness is significantly related to economic 
developments. In particular, more open economies exhibit a higher level of 
consumption and investment growth which also translates into a significant increase of 
GDP growth. Finally, at the aggregate level, population is found, as expected, positively 
related to growth. 
                                                 
9 The IRFs computed from the basic and extended specifications tend to overlap.  
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Finally, we investigate the extent to which our previous results are affected by 
the size of the government. In this context, Baldacci et al. (2009) argue that fiscal policy 
may be ineffective when initial fiscal conditions are poor, while Corsetti et al. (2011) 
sustain that fiscal stimulus can be counterproductive when the fiscal stance is weak. 
We assess this issue by: (i) dropping from the sample the countries that have 
been historically characterized by the highest level of government size (as measured by 
the government spending to GDP ratio); and (ii) re-estimating equations (2) to (4). 
More specifically, we exclude France, U.S., and all European countries. The 
estimates reported in Table 4 confirm the robustness of our previous findings and, 
therefore, show that the impact of fiscal discretion on private spending is not 
conditional on government size. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. ] 
 
To shed some light on the magnitude and timing of fiscal policy effects, we 
estimate the average impulse-response functions (IRFs) of output growth and its two 
main components (consumption and investment) to discretionary spending.  
Figure 1 shows that an increase of 1% in discretionary spending typically 
increases GDP growth by, approximately, 0.047% within the first year, which, given the 
share of government consumption to GDP, corresponds to a multiplier of about 0.40. It 
is followed by a decline of about three years when the fall in GDP growth reaches -
0.027%. At first glance, the size of such effects might appear small. However, we 
remark that, in our analysis, discretionary spending refers to changes in government 
consumption that do not represent any reaction to economic conditions (i.e. automatic 
stabilizers are previously accounted for). In addition, we need to consider that a large 
part of the variability in output is directly explained by its own dynamics (which cannot 
be neglected). For these reasons, we expect these magnitudes for the effects of 
discretionary policy. That said, the reported estimates are in line with the range of short-
term multipliers’ estimates of total government spending presented in previous 
empirical studies and based on structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models, large 
multinational macro models (Henry et al., 2008) and DSGE models (Coenen et al., 
2011). A visual inspection of Figure 1 also confirms our intuition concerning the 
relevance of crowding effects. For both private consumption and private investment, 
crowding-in effects dominate in the short-run, while crowding-out effects are more 
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powerful in the long-run. However, we find that crowding-out is never strong enough to 
cancel out the entire expansionary thrust of discretionary spending, that is, some net 
stimulus to the economy remains.  
Interestingly, the strength and timing of crowding effects significantly changes 
between the two demand components. More specifically, the amplitude of crowding 
effects is notably higher for private investment than for consumption. In addition, the 
duration of the crowding-in effect is shorter (around one year) for investment. In 
contrast, discretionary spending crowds-out consumption for a relatively shorter time. 
This piece of evidence is in line with the works of Heim (2010b, 2010c), who shows 
that government deficits crowd-out both private consumption and investment. However, 
while government spending deficits are associated with a complete crowding-out effect 
(i.e. no net stimulus impact), tax cut deficits lead to net negative economic effects. 
In brief, we conclude that an increase of discretionary spending temporarily 
stimulates economic activity, mainly by speeding up gross capital formation and 
growth. However, as the economy expands, the crowding-out effect takes over: more 
government borrowing will force some private borrowers out, discouraged by the higher 
interest rates. This process will reduce investment spending and cancel out some of the 
expansionary effects of higher government spending. As a result, capital stock and GDP 
grow slower and consumer’s demand declines. 
 
   [ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. ] 
 
3.3 Evidence for OECD versus Non-OECD countries 
       The analysis presented so far has shown evidence on the existence of crowding-in 
and crowding-out effects. But are these effects similar for among groups of countries? 
To answer this question, we replicate the estimation of equations (2)-(4) for developed 
(OECD) and developing (Non-OECD) countries. In principle, one could be interested in 
considering more specific geographic areas. Unfortunately, the limited number of 
countries belonging to each sub-sample (such as Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, North 
America and so on) makes it impossible to get plausible estimates from the dynamic 
panel model using instrumental variables. 
In fact, the GMM estimators can generate moment conditions prolifically, with 
the instruments proliferating in the time dimension of the panel, T.  This can cause 
several econometric problems in finite samples, the most important consequence being 
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that standard errors are downward biased.  This does not allow us to use two-step 
“GMM-style” estimates for inference purposes (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Moreover, 
the Hansen-test becomes weaker, generating implausible p-values of 1.000 (Andersen 
and Sorensen, 1996).  
Even considering two sub-samples like OECD and Non-OECD, their dimension 
is rather small in a GMM framework and candidate instruments outnumber countries. 
Therefore, in order to avoid instrument “over-proliferation” and the problems discussed 
above, we estimate, for each sub-sample, models (2)-(4) using a more parsimonious IV-
2SLS estimator where only the second and third lags of the dependent variables are 
used as instruments. Results are reported in Table 5, while IRFs are plotted in Figure 2.  
We find that the effect of discretionary spending varies substantially between the 
two groups of countries. With regards to the effects on consumption growth, we note 
that crowding-in effects are strongly magnified in OECD countries. In fact, an increase 
of 1% in discretionary spending typically boosts consumption growth by 0.17% (within 
the first year). Such effect is limited to 0.05% in the case of developing countries 
(which is close to the estimate for the benchmark model). Both the size and the 
persistence of crowding-out effects are higher for developing countries (-0.03%) than 
for OECD economies. Turning to the impact on investment, we can see that crowding-
in effects are more persistent in OECD countries than in developing countries. This 
leads to a long-lasting (almost two years) increase of the GDP growth rate. In the long-
run, however, crowding-out effects prevail and their negative impact on private 
investment is sizeable (-0.26%), being almost two times larger than in non-OECD 
countries (-0.14%). As a result, on the investment side, the impact of discretionary 
government spending is more detrimental for the OECD group. This contrasting 
evidence for OECD and non-OECD countries gives support to the argument that poor 
capacity of implementation and larger macroeconomic risks explain the limited scope 
for fiscal policy in developing countries (Botman and Kumar, 2006). 
A last remark should be brought to the discussion: the results are robust to the 
inclusion of additional control variables (column 2).  
 
   [ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. ] 
 
   [ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. ] 
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4. Fiscal Policy in Times of Crisis 
4.1 Evaluating the impact of fiscal policy during crisis episodes 
Financial crises can be contagious and damaging as they typically lead 
economies into recessions and sharp current account imbalances. Among their causes, 
one can refer to: (i) credit booms; (ii) currency and maturity mismatches; (iii) large 
capital inflows; and (iv) unsustainable macroeconomic policies. 
A key concern is what policymakers can do both to reduce the economic 
consequences of such events and to prevent their occurrence in the future. Similarly, a 
crucial question is how macroeconomic activity is affected in the short and medium 
term, and, in particular, how it responds to expansionary fiscal policy interventions. 
In order to assess whether the size and timing of crowding-in and crowding-out 
effects change in time of crises, we look at the effects of discretionary spending shocks 
on the private sector conditioning them on the occurrence of several typology of crises. 
In detail, for each crisis, we enlarge our baseline specifications (2)-(4) and include an 
additional set of regressors which are obtained by interacting the discretionary 
component of spending ( ) with a dummy (Crisis) that takes the value of one when a 
crisis occurs and zero otherwise. In accordance with the definition and identification of 
crises for a set of 70 countries as provided by Reinharth and Rogoff (2011), we consider 
the following episodes: a) banking crises; b) currency crises; c) domestic debt default 
(or restructuring); d) external debt default (or restructuring) and e) inflation crises. 
Then, we estimate, for each typology of crisis, k, the equations: 
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where all the variables have the usual meanings. The higher the statistical significance 
of the parameter ϕ , the more important is the role played by the crisis in determining 
the size and persistence of crowding-in and crowding-out effects. 
16 
 
4.2 Banking crises 
Table 6 summarizes the evidence for banking crises. The results suggest that 
once episodes of baking crises are controlled for, (unconditional) discretionary shocks 
in public spending have a larger effect than the one presented in the baseline. In 
particular, we find that a 1 percent shock in the discretionary component of fiscal 
spending boosts GDP growth by about 0.06% over the first year, which corresponds to a 
multiplier of 0.5. Similarly, this crowding-in effect emerges for both consumption and 
investment growth, although it tends to be larger for the later (0.16% versus 0.21-
0.26%, respectively). Note, however, that the impact on investment seems to be less 
persistent, as crowding-out effects emerge after 3 years. In addition, although the 
occurrence of a banking crisis does not seem to affect the impact of fiscal policy on 
private consumption and private investment, there is some evidence suggesting that the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy discretion may be weaker after 3 years. Finally, in line 
with previous empirical evidence (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Cerra and Saxena, 
2008; Furceri and Zdienicka 2011) the occurrence of a banking crisis severely affects 
GDP growth and private investment. 
 
   [ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE. ] 
 
4.3 Currency crises 
Table 7 describes the results for currency crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
suggest that banking crises precede currency crashes. As a result, the collapsing value of 
the domestic currency that takes place after the banking crisis may undermine the 
solvency of private and sovereign borrowers who hold large amounts of foreign 
currency debts. 
The empirical findings show that (unconditional) fiscal policy discretion shocks 
can help boosting economic growth in the short-run even when we control for the 
occurrence of currency crises: a 1% shock in government spending raises GDP, private 
consumption and private investment by 0.05%, 0.10% and 0.22%, respectively. As in 
the case of a banking crisis, the impact on investment does not last long, as crowding-
out effects emerge after 3 years. Similarly, the occurrence of a currency crisis does not 
seem to dramatically affect the relationship between fiscal policy discretion and 
economic activity. Nevertheless, there is weak evidence suggesting that in such 
circumstances, fiscal policy stimuli may lead to an amplification of the crowding-out 
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effects in private consumption and investment. Moreover, although the size of 
crowding-out effects is not strong enough to revert the initial crowding-in effects in the 
case of investment, for consumption the crowding-out effects may overtake the 
crowding-in impact. Finally, it can be seen that the occurrence of a currency crisis has a 
substantial impact on the average consumption growth. 
 
   [ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE. ] 
 
4.4 Domestic debt crises 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) sustain that domestic debt crises are typically 
characterized by four features. First, they occur when economic conditions are worse 
than the average external default. Second, they do not typically involve external 
creditors. Third, suspension of payments on domestic debt does not often occur. Fourth, 
domestic debt crisis involving deposit freezes or forcible conversion of foreign currency 
deposits into local currency can take place during banking crises, hyperinflations, or 
both.  
Our results show that when we control for debt crises the (unconditional) 
positive effects of fiscal policy stimulus are mainly confined to the short-term, where a 
1% increase in fiscal policy discretion can raise private consumption growth and private 
investment growth by 0.14% and 0.22%, respectively. As before, the effects on private 
investment are of shorter duration given that the initial positive impact erodes and even 
becomes negative after 3 years. Most importantly, these medium-term crowding-out 
effects (about -0.23%) are stronger that the short-term crowding-in effects. In addition, 
it is possible to observe that the effect of fiscal policy discretion during periods of debt 
crises tends to be detrimental for the overall economy even in the short-run (where GDP 
growth falls by 0.11%). This suggests that higher spending that is financed by 
borrowing tends to reduce policy credibility and exacerbate the debt crisis. Moreover, it 
may induce a credit shortage that leads to a fall in private consumption and investment 
spending (Heim, 2010d).  
Rising concerns about debt sustainability also crowds-out private investment. 
This is in line with the idea that high public debt levels limit the scope for fiscal 
stimulus due to the perception of the markets of a higher risk premium associated with 
larger deficits (Ardagna, 2009). In addition, it is consistent with the argument that the 
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effectiveness of fiscal policy may be small when initial fiscal conditions are poor 
(Baldacci et al., 2009). 
 
   [ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE. ] 
 
4.5 External debt crises 
We now turn to the analysis of external debt crises. These typically involve 
outright default on payment of debt obligations incurred under foreign legal jurisdiction, 
repudiation, or the restructuring of debt into terms less favorable to the lender than in 
the original. While the time of default is accurately classified as a crisis year, there are a 
large number of cases where the final resolution with the creditors (if it ever did take 
place) seems interminable. As a result, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) construct dummy 
variables where only the first year of default enters as a crisis, in to the country-specific 
dummy variables that cover the entire episode. 
In developing and transitional economies, an external debt crisis often takes 
place together with a currency crisis. It mainly occurs when there is an excessive 
accumulation of foreign currency debt relative to domestic currency debt. Thus, in the 
presence of a large capital outflow, the country’s economy is hardly hit by the burst of 
asset prices bubble and the subsequent depreciation of domestic currency. 
The results obtained when external debt crises are considered (Table 9) suggest 
that under normal circumstances – i.e. in the absence of external debt crises -, a 1% 
shock in fiscal discretion: a) boosts private consumption in the short-term (a 0.09% 
increase); b) crowds-out private investment in the medium-term (a 0.17% reduction); 
and c) does not have a statistically significant impact on GDP growth. However, under 
exceptional circumstances – i.e. conditioning the effect of fiscal discretion on the 
occurrence of an external debt crisis, one can observe a negative impact on GDP growth 
over the medium-term (-0.06% at the 3-year horizon) that is largely explained by the 
crowding-out effect over private consumption (-0.16%). As in the case of currency 
crises, episodes of instability in the external accounts can severely impact on the 
average consumption growth rate. 
 
   [ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE. ] 
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4.6 Inflation crises 
In Table 10, we assess the role of inflation crises. These episodes are typically 
chronic as they last for many years. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) used a twelve-month 
inflation threshold of 40% or higher percent to define a “freely falling” episode. More 
recently Reihnart and Rogoff (2010) define an inflation crisis using a threshold of 20% 
per annum. 
Controlling for the occurrence of inflation crises, we find that a 1% positive 
(unconditional) shock to fiscal spending stimulates GDP growth (0.07%) in the short-
term (within 1 year), but crowds-out private investment (-0.27%) in the medium-term (3 
years ahead). Taking into account the share of government consumption to GDP, this 
translates into a short-run multiplier of 0.6.   
In addition, while crowding-in effects are quantitatively unchanged, crowing-out 
effects are magnified for private consumption and, to a less estent, for private 
investment. Putting it differently, this implies that a tightening of fiscal policy (i.e. a 
negative spending shock) is expected to have a negative impact on aggregate demand, 
thereby reducing the price level in the short-term. However, in the long-run, private 
consumption is boosted as a result of the increase of confidence on the sustainability of 
the fiscal stance. 
 
   [ INSERT TABLE 10 HERE. ] 
 
4.7 Quantifying the size of crowding-in and crowding-out effects 
The whole evidence for fiscal policy during times of crisis is summarized in 
Table 11 and Figure 3. More specifically, Table 11 describes the size of crowding-in 
and crowding-out effects by type of crisis, while Figure 3 displays the impulse-response 
functions (IRFs) to a positive shock to fiscal policy discretion for each type of crisis.  
We find that, regardless the typology of crisis, crowding-in effects dominate 
during the first years of the crises. Compared to the baseline (benchmark) scenario, the 
size of crowding-in effects is magnified during crisis periods, which suggests that there 
is a great scope for fiscal policy stimuli packages under such exceptional circumstances.  
However, in the long-run, crowding-out effects take over and significantly reduce 
private investment growth and, to a small extent, private consumption growth. 
Interestingly, under the crises scenario, the crowding-out effects might be strong 
enough to cancel out the entire expansionary thrust of government spending. 
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Consequently, the unconventional policy measures undertaken by governments during 
crises might have destabilizing long-run effects. As a result, extraordinarily 
expansionary fiscal measures may need to be withdrawn in a timely manner. This result 
is in line with the works by Claessens et al. (2004) and Cerra et al. (2009) and the 
recommendations of international institutions (IMF, 2009a; OECD, 2009). 
 
   [ INSERT TABLE 11 HERE. ] 
 
   [ INSERT FIGURE 3a HERE. ] 
 
   [ INSERT FIGURE 3b HERE. ] 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we assess the dynamic macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy 
discretion. In particular, we look at the size of the crowding-in and crowding-out effects 
and check whether there is a trade-off between the short-term impact and the medium-
term implications of a positive fiscal policy shock. We do this by analysing a panel of 
132 countries from 1960 to 2008. 
The results show that fiscal policy discretion can provide a net stimulus to the 
economy in the short-run, but crowding-out effects emerge in the long-run. However, , 
in general, these are not strong enough to cancel out the expansionary path of 
government spending and, as a result, fiscal policy is a key stabilizing tool during 
economic downturns. 
We also find that crowding-in effects are of larger magnitude and more 
persistent for OECD countries, while crowding-out effects seem to be more detrimental 
for private investment than for private consumption. 
Looking at the role of fiscal policy in times of crisis, our findings suggest that 
crowding-in effects are amplified once such exceptional circumstances are controlled 
for – in particular, banking crises - and dominate in the short-run, a feature that 
corroborates the idea of a great scope for fiscal policy stimulus packages. However, 
crowding-out effects take over in the long-run and negatively impinge on private 
sector’s spending. For instance, in the case of debt crises, a boost in government 
spending has a negative and persistent effect of real GDP growth, in line with the rising 
concerns about the long-term sustainability of the debt path. 
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Summing up, our research suggests that there is a trade-off between the short-
term and the medium-term impact of fiscal policy. In particular, in the outcome of a 
crisis episode, fiscal measures should be withdrawn in a timely manner and a well-
conceived austerity plan may need to be adopted in order to guarantee a sustainable 
growth path and avoid destabilizing market tensions. As a result, ensuring a stable 
macroeconomic environment and the adopting sound fiscal policies in normal times 
seems to be crucial to enhance the effectiveness of fiscal policy when economies are hit 
by extraordinary shocks (Tavares and Valkanov, 2001) and to shorten the length of such 
episodes (Baldacci et al., 2009; Spilimbergo et al., 2009). 
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Table 2: Share of discretionary spending in government consumption ( )stst gv . 
 
Sample Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
OECD 0.13% 0.11% -0.43% 0.62% 
Non-OECD 0.18% 1.53% -25.73% 33.67% 
     
Low income 0.22% 2.23% -25.73% 33.67% 
Lower-middle income 0.14% 0.39% -7.42% 2.08% 
Upper-middle income 0.15% 0.31% -1.76% 2.15% 
     
Asia and Pacific 0.17% 0.28% -0.77% 3.83% 
South America and West Indies 0.13% 0.44% -7.42% 1.56% 
Middle  East 0.18% 0.23% -0.61% 1.09% 
Africa 0.22% 2.32% -25.73% 33.67% 
Europe 0.13% 0.20% -1.57% 2.08% 
North-America 0.11% 0.11% -0.18% 0.45% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Dynamic panel estimation (Baseline model). 
 
 GDP growth Consumption growth Investment growth 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.194*** 0.184*** -0.020 -0.015 0.109** 0.095** 
 [0.044] [0.052] [0.039] [0.035] [0.043] [0.046] 
1, −tiv  0.045** 0.047** 0.063** 0.061** 0.145* 0.149* 
 [0.020] [0.021] [0.031] [0.031] [0.078] [0.078] 
2, −tiv  -0.012 -0.015 0.039 0.034 -0.087 -0.103* 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.030] [0.029] [0.058] [0.058] 
3, −tiv  -0.017 -0.015 -0.031 -0.031 -0.087* -0.114** 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.029] [0.026] [0.054] [0.053] 
4, −tiv  -0.025** -0.024** -0.034 -0.036 -0.020 -0.020 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.024] [0.023] [0.058] [0.057] 
Population growth - 0.544** - 0.361 - 0.957 
 - [0.275] - [0.323] - [0.719] 
Openness - 0.014** - 0.025*** - 0.041** 
 - [0.007] - [0.009] - [0.017] 
Total Observations 3085 3023 3016 2954 2835 2773 
Number of countries 132 130 131 129 130 128 
AR(1) test statistic -4.10 -4.02 -5.30 -5.49 -4.43 -4.35 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test statistic -0.62 -0.60 -0.82 -0.75 -0.91 -1.00 
p-value 0.54 0.55 0.41 0.45 0.36 0.32 
Hansen Statistic 40.36 41.13 49.06 43.95 70.87 74.94 
p-value 0.41 0.38 0.13 0.27 0.73 0.61 
Note: Dynamic panel-data estimation (two-step Difference GMM). Robust standard errors in square brackets. *, **, *** 
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Parameter estimates associated to time effects are not 
reported for sake of space. 
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Table 6: Dynamic panel estimation (Banking crisis).  
 GDP growth Consumption growth Investment growth 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.273*** 0.289*** 0.028 0.049 0.220*** 0.221*** 
 [0.056] [0.048] [0.043] [0.043] [0.047] [0.049] 
1, −tiv  0.061** 0.058** 0.162*** 0.155*** 0.213** 0.257** 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.030] [0.029] [0.096] [0.101] 
2, −tiv  0.000 -0.001 0.008 0.014 -0.099 -0.115 
 [0.021] [0.020] [0.032] [0.033] [0.076] [0.086] 
3, −tiv  0.006 0.007 -0.041 -0.046 -0.190** -0.191** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.034] [0.032] [0.074] [0.084] 
4, −tiv  -0.01 -0.003 0.011 0.015 0.034 0.021 
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.031] [0.032] [0.049] [0.054] ( ) 1−× tii vCrisis  -0.056 -0.046 -0.092 -0.105 0.093 -0.015 
 [0.036] [0.035] [0.076] [0.076] [0.153] [0.149] ( ) 2−× tii vCrisis  -0.006 -0.013 0.000 -0.012 0.044 0.071 
 [0.040] [0.041] [0.072] [0.072] [0.190] [0.199] ( ) 3−× tii vCrisis  -0.099** -0.101** -0.129 -0.11 -0.24 -0.264 
 [0.040] [0.045] [0.101] [0.102] [0.198] [0.221] ( ) 4−× tii vCrisis  -0.031 -0.034 -0.015 -0.017 -0.077 -0.064 
 [0.037] [0.036] [0.060] [0.060] [0.150] [0.154] 
1, −tiCrisis  -0.758* -0.452 -0.684 -0.553 -3.058** -2.995* 
 [0.446] [0.442] [0.669] [0.686] [1.450] [1.677] 
2, −tiCrisis  0.443 0.491 0.459 0.502 0.899 1.207 
 [0.454] [0.436] [0.676] [0.753] [1.872] [2.116] 
3, −tiCrisis  0.218 0.147 0.417 0.366 1.980 1.972 
 [0.381] [0.374] [0.466] [0.514] [1.516] [1.592] 
4, −tiCrisis  0.053 0.033 0.125 0.165 0.347 0.559 
 [0.324] [0.315] [0.347] [0.351] [1.241] [1.237] 
Population growth  0.081  0.222  0.288 
  [0.168]  [0.216]  [0.647] 
Openness  0.019***  0.019**  0.036*** 
  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.013] 
Total Observations 1943 1920 1924 1901 1838 1815 
Number of countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 
AR(1) test statistic -4.54 -4.60 -3.69 -3.76 -3.70 -3.73 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test statistic -1.32 -1.21 -0.77 -0.57 -1.56 -1.54 
p-value 0.19 0.23 0.44 0.57 0.12 0.12 
Hansen Statistic 50.37 50.21 50.14 51.43 43.72 49.54 
p-value 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.12 
Note: Dynamic panel-data estimation (two-step Difference GMM). Robust standard errors in square 
brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 7: Dynamic panel estimation (Currency crisis). 
 
 GDP growth Consumption growth Investment growth 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.284*** 0.298*** 0.041 0.056 0.223*** 0.223*** 
 [0.053] [0.048] [0.042] [0.043] [0.045] [0.044] 
1, −tiv  0.057** 0.049* 0.101** 0.094** 0.225** 0.224** 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.039] [0.038] [0.114] [0.109] 
2, −tiv  0.027 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.071 0.076 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.046] [0.048] [0.112] [0.106] 
3, −tiv  -0.02 -0.019 0.006 0.015 -0.419*** -0.433*** 
 [0.030] [0.031] [0.039] [0.038] [0.121] [0.124] 
4, −tiv  -0.008 -0.002 0.024 0.023 0.132 0.142 
 [0.021] [0.018] [0.025] [0.023] [0.122] [0.111] ( ) 1−× tii vCrisis  -0.026 -0.021 0.03 0.03 -0.006 0.010 
 [0.033] [0.035] [0.063] [0.063] [0.140] [0.154] ( ) 2−× tii vCrisis  -0.053* -0.044 -0.007 -0.003 -0.256** -0.279** 
 [0.031] [0.030] [0.047] [0.045] [0.132] [0.130] ( ) 3−× tii vCrisis  -0.003 -0.001 -0.142** -0.147** 0.326* 0.354* 
 [0.038] [0.039] [0.057] [0.060] [0.192] [0.185] ( ) 4−× tii vCrisis  -0.007 -0.009 -0.044 -0.032 -0.254 -0.272* 
 [0.028] [0.025] [0.052] [0.049] [0.173] [0.157] 
1, −tiCrisis  -0.216 -0.092 -1.598*** -1.462*** -1.180 -1.123 
 [0.317] [0.305] [0.397] [0.391] [1.086] [1.159] 
2, −tiCrisis  0.45 0.474 0.462 0.524 2.760*** 3.055*** 
 [0.308] [0.296] [0.346] [0.364] [0.789] [0.926] 
3, −tiCrisis  -0.204 -0.181 0.968** 1.052** -0.825 -0.695 
 [0.311] [0.302] [0.426] [0.433] [0.986] [1.026] 
4, −tiCrisis  -0.080 -0.106 -0.089 -0.106 1.580 1.745 
 [0.181] [0.172] [0.338] [0.328] [1.335] [1.314] 
Population growth  0.088  0.240  0.203 
  [0.157]  [0.220]  [0.643] 
Openness  0.017***  0.019***  0.041*** 
  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.014] 
Total Observations 1938 1915 1919 1896 1833 1810 
Number of countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 
AR(1) test statistic -4.49 -4.53 -3.78 -3.79 -3.82 -3.92 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test statistic -1.23 -1.14 -0.35 -0.16 -1.55 -1.51 
p-value 0.22 0.25 0.73 0.88 0.12 0.13 
Hansen Statistic 51.84 50.67 45.75 46.55 42.27 46.86 
p-value 0.08 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.33 0.18 
Note: Dynamic panel-data estimation (two-step Difference GMM). Robust standard errors in square 
brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 8: Dynamic panel estimation (Domestic debt crisis). 
 GDP growth Consumption growth Investment growth 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.284*** 0.305*** 0.039 0.055 0.234*** 0.230*** 
 [0.056] [0.047] [0.040] [0.040] [0.049] [0.047] 
1, −tiv  0.061* 0.059* 0.156*** 0.144*** 0.227** 0.215** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.033] [0.101] [0.100] 
2, −tiv  0.010 0.004 0.024 0.022 -0.052 -0.055 
 [0.025] [0.023] [0.028] [0.030] [0.094] [0.095] 
3, −tiv  -0.003 -0.004 -0.04 -0.034 -0.242*** -0.234*** 
 [0.017] [0.015] [0.043] [0.042] [0.066] [0.066] 
4, −tiv  -0.01 -0.004 -0.012 -0.007 0.03 0.037 
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.026] [0.026] [0.072] [0.071] ( ) 1−× tii vCrisis  -0.113** -0.116** -0.115 -0.111 0.056 0.063 
 [0.047] [0.047] [0.081] [0.078] [0.225] [0.228] ( ) 2−× tii vCrisis  -0.089 -0.087 -0.038 -0.029 -0.121 -0.123 
 [0.061] [0.059] [0.086] [0.086] [0.200] [0.218] ( ) 3−× tii vCrisis  -0.100 -0.090 -0.155 -0.155 -0.192 -0.205 
 [0.071] [0.069] [0.101] [0.107] [0.249] [0.278] ( ) 4−× tii vCrisis  0.004 -0.006 0.039 0.035 -0.075 -0.089 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.076] [0.074] 
1, −tiCrisis  -0.742 -0.594 -0.99 -0.725 -5.246 -4.259 
 [1.164] [1.101] [0.759] [0.818] [3.672] [3.520] 
2, −tiCrisis  1.278 1.321 1.699 1.314 7.401 7.001 
 [1.091] [1.063] [1.220] [1.308] [4.508] [4.493] 
3, −tiCrisis  -0.967 -1.159 -0.533 -0.460 1.339 1.404 
 [1.126] [1.070] [1.216] [1.165] [2.380] [2.235] 
4, −tiCrisis  0.162 0.141 0.967 1.212* -2.581 -2.130 
 [0.925] [0.862] [0.669] [0.711] [2.577] [2.565] 
Population growth  0.058  0.241  -0.003 
  [0.164]  [0.227]  [0.545] 
Openness  0.018***  0.018**  0.036*** 
  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.012] 
Total Observations 1943 1920 1924 1901 1838 1815 
Number of countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 
AR(1) test statistic -4.48 -4.58 -3.80 -3.84 -3.68 -3.69 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test statistic -1.19 -1.04 -0.70 -0.56 -1.39 -1.39 
p-value 0.24 0.30 0.48 0.58 0.17 0.17 
Hansen Statistic 51.42 49.87 47.77 48.31 43.84 45.47 
p-value 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.22 
Note: Dynamic panel-data estimation (two-step Difference GMM). Robust standard errors in square 
brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Dynamic panel estimation (External debt crisis). 
 GDP growth Consumption growth Investment growth 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.295*** 0.305*** 0.048 0.062 0.232*** 0.224*** 
 [0.055] [0.048] [0.047] [0.047] [0.046] [0.048] 
1, −tiv  0.04 0.036 0.100** 0.090** 0.2 0.201 
 [0.034] [0.033] [0.040] [0.038] [0.147] [0.151] 
2, −tiv  0.001 -0.007 0.005 0.014 -0.09 -0.113 
 [0.036] [0.034] [0.055] [0.058] [0.156] [0.177] 
3, −tiv  0.003 0.008 -0.013 -0.005 -0.188** -0.170** 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.041] [0.039] [0.077] [0.070] 
4, −tiv  -0.015 -0.006 0.008 0.011 0.053 0.074 
 [0.017] [0.014] [0.025] [0.023] [0.093] [0.092] ( ) 1−× tii vCrisis  -0.002 -0.002 0.057 0.056 0.074 0.065 
 [0.040] [0.039] [0.079] [0.075] [0.239] [0.257] ( ) 2−× tii vCrisis  0.003 0.013 0.001 -0.016 -0.017 0.015 
 [0.043] [0.042] [0.075] [0.080] [0.301] [0.337] ( ) 3−× tii vCrisis  -0.058* -0.064** -0.149* -0.156** -0.116 -0.15 
 [0.031] [0.032] [0.080] [0.080] [0.240] [0.224] ( ) 4−× tii vCrisis  0.014 -0.001 -0.017 -0.015 -0.109 -0.14 
 [0.023] [0.021] [0.037] [0.036] [0.213] [0.209] 
1, −tiCrisis  -0.574 -0.358 -1.631** -1.312* -0.049 0.37 
 [0.537] [0.587] [0.695] [0.759] [1.787] [1.817] 
2, −tiCrisis  0.465 0.424 0.906 0.704 2.76 3.119 
 [0.630] [0.679] [0.902] [0.999] [1.943] [2.010] 
3, −tiCrisis  -0.165 -0.174 0.06 0.096 -1.262 -1.815 
 [0.455] [0.439] [0.668] [0.636] [1.749] [1.818] 
4, −tiCrisis  -0.012 0.057 0.555 0.523 0.318 0.696 
 [0.379] [0.358] [0.712] [0.681] [2.007] [2.198] 
Population growth  0.099  0.245  0.139 
  [0.160]  [0.224]  [0.700] 
Openness  0.017***  0.018**  0.044*** 
  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.015] 
Total Observations 1943 1920 1924 1901 1838 1815 
Number of countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 
AR(1) test statistic -4.51 -4.55 -3.78 -3.81 -3.70 -3.66 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test statistic -1.28 -1.19 -0.48 -0.33 -1.54 -1.53 
p-value 0.20 0.24 0.63 0.74 0.13 0.13 
Hansen Statistic 50.32 50.16 49.75 48.62 42.03 45.50 
p-value 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.34 0.22 
Note: Dynamic panel-data estimation (two-step Difference GMM). Robust standard errors in square 
brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 10: Dynamic panel estimation (Inflation crisis). 
 GDP growth Consumption growth Investment growth 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.289*** 0.304*** 0.034 0.054 0.233*** 0.235*** 
 [0.055] [0.049] [0.045] [0.049] [0.048] [0.045] 
1, −tiv  0.088*** 0.073** 0.113 0.094 0.206 0.246 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.070] [0.079] [0.187] [0.180] 
2, −tiv  -0.004 -0.003 0.078 0.079 0.142 0.106 
 [0.036] [0.037] [0.072] [0.078] [0.169] [0.166] 
3, −tiv  0.004 0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.251* -0.269** 
 [0.046] [0.046] [0.060] [0.058] [0.134] [0.136] 
4, −tiv  -0.025 -0.019 0.027 0.021 -0.083 -0.083 
 [0.020] [0.017] [0.034] [0.030] [0.068] [0.062] ( ) 1−× tii vCrisis  -0.082* -0.062 0.004 0.019 0.072 0.028 
 [0.049] [0.055] [0.110] [0.135] [0.248] [0.240] ( ) 2−× tii vCrisis  0.006 0.004 -0.124* -0.120* -0.347* -0.320* 
 [0.058] [0.058] [0.070] [0.073] [0.199] [0.199] ( ) 3−× tii vCrisis  -0.048 -0.051 -0.104 -0.110 -0.017 0.006 
 [0.060] [0.061] [0.072] [0.075] [0.178] [0.179] ( ) 4−× tii vCrisis  0.029 0.025 -0.058 -0.039 0.186* 0.183* 
 [0.025] [0.023] [0.048] [0.046] [0.104] [0.104] 
1, −tiCrisis  0.051 -0.014 -0.930* -0.961* 1.623 2.064 
 [0.445] [0.438] [0.497] [0.514] [1.523] [1.319] 
2, −tiCrisis  0.445 0.475 1.582*** 1.724*** 2.051 2.119 
 [0.454] [0.448] [0.582] [0.601] [1.863] [1.733] 
3, −tiCrisis  -0.488 -0.384 -0.371 -0.371 -0.596 -0.940 
 [0.421] [0.421] [0.656] [0.650] [1.650] [1.540] 
4, −tiCrisis  0.091 0.169 -0.406 -0.293 0.063 0.644 
 [0.325] [0.297] [0.405] [0.426] [1.936] [1.794] 
Population growth  0.121  0.176  0.002 
  [0.164]  [0.223]  [0.597] 
Openness  0.016***  0.020**  0.044*** 
  [0.005]  [0.008]  [0.014] 
Total Observations 1943 1920 1924 1901 1838 1815 
Number of countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 
AR(1) test statistic -4.48 -4.53 -3.68 -3.69 -3.67 -3.73 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test statistic -1.29 -1.19 -0.61 -0.39 -1.44 -1.40 
p-value 0.20 0.24 0.54 0.69 0.15 0.16 
Hansen Statistic 50.35 49.65 51.03 52.59 44.52 42.84 
p-value 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.25 0.31 
Note: Dynamic panel-data estimation (two-step Difference GMM). Robust standard errors in square 
brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 11: The size of crowding-in and crowding-out effects. 
 
 GDP growth Consumption growth Investment growth 
Type of crisis Crowd-in Crowd-out Crowd-in Crowd-out Crowd-in Crowd-out 
       
Bank Crises 0.012 -0.097 0.050 -0.156 0.242 -0.452 
Currency Crises 0.028 -0.024 0.124 -0.131 0.235 -0.156 
Domestic Debt Crises 0.000 -0.124 0.032 -0.189 0.278 -0.466 
Ext. Debt Crises 0.034 -0.051 0.146 -0.160 0.266 -0.328 
Inflation Crises 0.011 -0.039 0.113 -0.115 0.274 -0.298 
       
OECD 0.090 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.190 -0.260 
       
Not-OECD 0.104 -0.027 0.054 -0.030 0.135 -0.146 
       
Baseline 0.047 -0.027 0.061 -0.035 0.149 -0.123 
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Figure 1: Impulse-response functions (Baseline model). 
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Note: Confidence bands at 68% level of significance.  Blue line refers to the model with additional 
control variables. 
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Figure 2: Impulse-response functions (Baseline model, Sub-samples). 
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Note: Confidence bands at 68% level of significance.  
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions (Crises). 
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